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Unsportsmanlike Conduct – Calling a Penalty 
on the NFLPA and NHLPA’s Duty of Fair 
Representation for Entering Players 
Ashton E. Stine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2019 National Football League (“NFL”) season saw 
Michael Thomas of the New Orleans Saints shatter the league’s 
single-season receptions record.1 But a look at the situation that 
transpired in the summer before this record-breaking campaign 
shows how close it was to not happening.2 Thomas, like an 
increasing number of young, superstar athletes, was unhappy 
with the terms of his rookie contract3—a contract that was 
provided to Thomas by the New Orleans Saints after he was 
selected as the forty-seventh overall pick in the 2016 NFL Draft.4 
Thomas’ initial deal with the Saints was predetermined by the 
rookie compensation restrictions in the 2011 collective 
bargaining agreement agreed upon by league owners and the 
National Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”).5  
As a second-round pick, Thomas was given a four-year, $5.1 
million contract of which $2.6 million was guaranteed.6 After 
being selected to the Pro Bowl following the 2017 and 2018 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2021, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. I would 
like to give special thanks for the expertise and kindness of my faculty advisor, Professor 
Stephanie Lascelles. I also wish to thank my family and friends for putting up with my 
incessant discussions of this topic and my obsession with sports in general. I could not 
have accomplished this Article without their love, support, and encouragement. 
 1 See NFL Single Season Leaders – Receptions, FOOTBALL DATABASE, 
http://www.footballdb.com/leaders/season-receiving-receptions [http://perma.cc/J42C-
TWUP] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 2 See Mike Triplett, Why the Saints had to break the bank for Michael Thomas, 
ESPN (Jul. 31, 2019), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/27294194/why-saints-had-break-
bank-michael-thomas [http://perma.cc/GL9Q-EZJV]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See generally Nat’l Football League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2011-2020, Art. 7, 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%2
0with%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/3AJX-R4FV] (last 
visited May 3, 2020). 
 6 Michael Thomas, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/new-orleans-
saints/michael-thomas-18996/ [http://perma.cc/7F78-V8Z8] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020) 
(showing that, when broken down on a per-year basis, Thomas was earning an average 
salary of $1,279,743 on his rookie contract). 
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seasons, and being named a First-Team All-Pro in 20187, Thomas 
was prepared to not report to Saints’ training camp in an attempt 
to secure a better contract.8 Ultimately Thomas and the Saints 
agreed on a five-year, $96.25 million contract extension—with a 
touch over $35.6 million guaranteed—that allowed him to be in 
training camp with his teammates in preparation for the 2019 
season9, a season that saw Thomas ultimately put out one of the 
most dominating performances by a wide receiver in NFL 
history. 
In just three years, Thomas had secured a deal worth over 
fifteen times that of his restrictive rookie deal that was mandated 
by the collective bargaining agreement. Was Thomas suddenly 
fifteen times the player he was when he was drafted? Or was this 
new deal a much more accurate reflection of Thomas’ correct 
value? In an industry where the average career length is 
measured in single-digit years and not decades, which dwarfs in 
comparison to the time spent preparing to reach the pinnacle, 
players must capitalize on their worth quickly.10  
There are a select number of players who are able to 
successfully negotiate a significantly more lucrative contract 
without the threat of a holdout.11 Unfortunately, Thomas’ story is 
quickly becoming the rule rather than the exception. A number of 
NFL and National Hockey League (“NHL”) players nearing the 
 
 7 Michael Thomas, PRO FOOTBALL REF., http://www.pro-football-
reference.com/players/T/ThomMi05.htm [http://perma.cc/LZE8-YM6V] (last visited Jan. 
26, 2020). 
 8 See Jenna West, Michael Thomas Doesn’t Report to Saints’ Training Camp While 
Seeking New Deal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 25, 2019), 
http://www.si.com/nfl/2019/07/25/michael-thomas-contract-saints-training-camp 
[http://perma.cc/44TH-85XG]. 
 9 See Mike Florio, Inside the Michael Thomas deal, NBC SPORTS (July 31, 2019, 
8:27 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2019/07/31/inside-the-michael-thomas-deal/ 
[http://perma.cc/5V38-V7CG] (stating that, when broken down on a per-year basis, 
Thomas’ new deal pays him an average base salary of $19.25 million per year). 
 10 See generally Heather Brown, Good Question: How Long Can Athletes Stay In The 
Game?, WCCO CBS MINNESOTA (Feb. 8, 2016, 10:44 PM), 
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2016/02/08/good-question-how-long-can-athletes-stay-in-
the-game/ [http://perma.cc/4N67-ULG6]; SI Wire, WSJ data analysis shows average 
length of NFL careers decreasing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/03/01/nfl-careers-shortened-two-years-data-analysis 
[http://perma.cc/E3XM-XBG3]. 
 11 See Mike Florio, Inside the Christian McCaffery contract, NBC SPORTS (Apr. 16, 
2020, 10:22 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2020/04/16/inside-the-christian-
mccaffrey-contract/ [http://perma.cc/36QZ-Y7Q7] (“McCaffrey got his new deal after only 
three seasons, without a holdout or any other public ugliness. It’s a testament to Panthers 
owner David Tepper, who recognized that McCaffrey is a high-talent, high-integrity core 
player who will be part of the franchise’s nucleus for years to come.”); see also Sportsnet 
Staff, Connor McDavid signs eight-year, $100M extension with Oilers, SPORTSNET (July 5, 
2017, 3:06 PM), http://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/connor-mcdavid-signs-eight-year-
extension-oilers/ [http://perma.cc/6AQQ-3LBQ] (“McDavid . . . still has one year remaining 
on his entry-level contract, so the extension doesn’t kick in until the 2018-19 season.”). 
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end of their existing contracts are using the leverage that their 
performances have created to secure themselves the money that 
they rightfully deserve. Le’Veon Bell12, Ezekiel Elliott13, Melvin 
Gordon14, Trent Williams15, and William Nylander16 are amongst 
the most recent high-profile names that are dissatisfied enough 
with their current contract situation to justify missing playing 
time to seek out a new contract. The parameters restricting rookie 
compensation in the NFL and NHL can and must be improved. 
The NFLPA and The National Hockey League Players’ Association 
(“NHLPA”)—the unions that represent these athletes in collective 
bargaining negotiations with league management—must act with 
the best interest of all their members in mind, not solely veteran 
players. 
Part II of this Article discusses the background and purpose of 
collective bargaining in American professional sports, the 
consequences of collective bargaining failure, and the results of 
player dissatisfaction. Part III of this Article describes the 
interconnected relationship between antitrust law and labor law 
in sports and details a current problem in the collective bargaining 
agreements of the NFL and the NHL—rookies are 
disproportionately subjected to unduly restrictive contract 
compensation as a result of bad faith negotiation by their 
respective players’ associations, in violation of the National Labor 
Relations Act. Part III continues with comparisons to past 
collective bargaining agreements and shows how players have 
responded to these restrictions by refusing to play under the 
existing terms of their contracts and their justification for seeking 
increased compensation. Finally, Part IV advocates for a proposal 
that prohibits players’ associations from negotiating different 
rights based on the time a player—or a class of players—has spent 
 
 12 See Danny Heifetz, Le’Veon Bell’s Holdout Feels Real This Time, RINGER (Sept. 5, 
2018, 4:46 PM), http://www.theringer.com/nfl/2018/9/5/17824408/leveon-bell-holdout-
contract-franchise-tag-pittsburgh-steelers [http://perma.cc/KBG9-LPL4]. 
 13 See Bill Williamson, All You Need To Know About The Ezekiel Elliott Holdout, 
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billwilliamson/2019/08/07/all-
you-need-to-know-about-the-ezekiel-elliott-holdout/#6290f80471c2 [http://perma.cc/3MPY-
4ZJK]. 
 14 See Dan Cancian, Melvin Gordon Holdout: Will Los Angeles Chargers Star Play This 
Year?, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 3, 2019, 12:07 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/will-melvin-gordon-
play-holdout-contract-los-angeles-chargers-1457433 [http://perma.cc/QJD9-WQBK]. 
 15 See Ethan Cadeaux, A timeline of the Trent Williams holdout: how did we get 
here?, NBC SPORTS WASHINGTON (Sept. 16, 2019, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.nbcsports.com/washington/redskins/timeline-trent-williams-holdout-how-did-
we-get-here [http://perma.cc/6YQ4-K5E5]. 
 16 See Mike Johnston, Report: Rival NHL execs question Maple Leafs forward 
Nylander’s value, SPORTSNET (Oct. 19, 2018, 7:16 PM), 
http://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/report-rival-nhl-execs-question-maple-leafs-forward-
nylanders-value/ [http://perma.cc/ZJN7-UKQD]. 
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in the league when negotiating future collective bargaining 
agreements. Part IV draws comparisons to both sports and non-
sports examples of players’ associations or unions not setting a 
maximum amount that entering talent is able to earn and further 
discusses the importance of implementing uniformity in the rights 
afforded to players when negotiating with league ownership.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Origins of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Collective bargaining agreements are “document[s] by which a 
labor union and an employer stipulate to the terms of employment 
for those employees that are party to the collective bargaining 
agreement which formulate the foundation for dealings between 
players’ unions and league ownership”.17 Collective bargaining 
agreements allow these unions—representing the players and their 
interests—and employers—representing the team owners and their 
interests—to negotiate and come to terms on crucial matters 
affecting league play.18 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) was introduced 
by Congress in 1935 “to protect the rights of employees and 
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail 
certain private sector labor and management practices, which 
can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. 
economy.”19 Section 9 of the NLRA provides: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective 
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the 
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
conditions of employment.20 
The NFLPA has been the unionized representative body of 
football players in the NFL since 195621, although NFL club 
owners did not recognize the union until 1968, when the first 
collective bargaining agreement was entered into.22 The NHLPA 
 
 17 Blake Yagman, Weekly Legal Brief: Collective Bargaining, Lockouts, and Strikes, 
FRONT OFFICE SPORTS (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.frntofficesport.com/weekly-legal-brief-
collective-bargaining-lockouts-and-strikes [http://perma.cc/68N5-8F8C]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-
work/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
 20 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). 
 21 About the NFLPA, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflpa.com/about 
[http://perma.cc/33L5-U6S2] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020). 
 22 NFL labor history since 1968, ESPN (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?page=nfl_labor_history [http://perma.cc/DB2X-78SG]. 
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was formed in 1967 and was recognized that same year by NHL 
club owners.23 The first collective bargaining agreement between 
the NHLPA and the NHL was reached in 1975.24 In the early 
stages of the respective players’ associations, the collective 
bargaining agreements between the sides were focused on “basic 
economic rights.”25 It was not until the players garnered more 
leverage vis-à-vis the owners that they began to redirect the 
narrative and push for more in their collective bargaining 
discussions, including securing a share of league revenues, and 
other salary related issues.26 
While labor negotiations between players’ unions and league 
owners may appear to be identical to that of non-sports 
industries, there are much deeper layers of factors to consider.27 
The sports industry combines an employee base that possesses a 
unique set of skills with a monopolistic employer.28 There are 
few, if any, substitute leagues for athletes that wish to ply their 
trades at the highest level and thus they must subject 
themselves to a lesser bargaining power vis-à-vis league 
owners.29  
B. Purpose of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Parity and 
Control 
Professional sports in North America are part of a large and 
ever-growing industry.30 While millions of North Americans enjoy 
sports on some level, team ownership is a privilege reserved for the 
ultra-rich.31 The Dallas Cowboys, often regarded as the benchmark 
franchise in North American sports, have a valuation of $5.5 billion 
while the Buffalo Bills, the NFL franchise with the lowest valuation, 
is still worth just south of $2 billion.32 The four major sports 
leagues—the NFL, NHL, National Basketball Association (“NBA”), 
 
 23 Frequently Asked Questions, NHLPA, http://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/what-we-
do/faq [http://perma.cc/UF8F-H8LP] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Gabe Feldman, Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports: The Duel Between 
Players and Owners and Labor Law and Antitrust Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 5 (Michael A. McCann ed., 2018). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 6. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Darren Heitner, Sports Industry To Reach $73.5 Billion By 2019, FORBES (Oct. 19, 
2017, 7:15AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2015/10/19/sports-industry-to-
reach-73-5-billion-by-2019/#7e94448c1b4b [http://perma.cc/8AE2-U8SS]. 
 31 See Michael Ozanian et al., The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams 2019: Cowboys Lead 
League at $5.5 Billion, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2019, 7:25 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2019/09/04/the-nfls-most-valuable-teams-2019-
cowboys-lead-league-at-55-billion/#2b6b29212f1b [http://perma.cc/8FRJ-DY9Z]. 
 32 See id. 
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and Major League Baseball (“MLB”)—collectively recognized 
approximately $31 billion dollars in revenue in their most recent 
seasons.33 All thirty-two NFL teams experienced positive operating 
incomes in 2019, with profits ranging from $28 million to $420 
million.34 These revenue figures are driven by television deals, 
advertisements, corporate sponsorships, gate revenues, and 
merchandise sales.35  
A vital consideration for these revenue drivers is the concept 
of parity or “fairness in play.”36 “In order to be successful . . . the 
public must believe that there is relative parity among the 
member teams and that each team has the opportunity of 
becoming a contender over a reasonable cycle of years . . . .”37 
Aiming to meet these parity goals, league collective bargaining 
agreements set forth and detail important competitive balance 
measures such as: (1) draft selection order, (2) restriction on 
player movement, and (3) salary control measures, or “salary 
caps.”38 
Most incoming players to the NFL and NHL enter through 
the draft process.39 It is through this process that organizations 
are given the “exclusive rights” to secure the services of the 
player.40 The NFL determines their draft selection order with a 
true reversal of the standings from the previous year.41 The NHL 
uses a lottery system where each non-playoff team has the 
 
 33 Devon Anderson, Ranking Professional Sports Leagues by Revenue, ULTIMATE 
CORP. LEAGUE (Apr. 10, 2019), http://www.ultimatecorporateleague.com/ranking-
professional-sports-leagues-by-revenue/ [http://perma.cc/5BCB-XRPD]. 
 34 See Ozanian, supra note 31, (showing that the Oakland Raiders realized $28 
million in operating income from revenue of $357 million while the Dallas Cowboys 
realized $420 million in operating income from revenue of $950 million). 
 35 See generally TJ Mathewson, TV is biggest driver in global sport league revenue, 
GLOB. SPORT MATTERS (Mar. 7, 2019), 
http://globalsportmatters.com/business/2019/03/07/tv-is-biggest-driver-in-global-sport-
league-revenue/ [http://perma.cc/8DJS-6B9B]. 
 36 Duane W. Rockerbie, Exploring Interleague Parity in North America: The NBA 
Anomaly, 17 J. OF SPORTS ECON. 286, 286 (2016). 
 37 Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 486 
(E.D. Pa. 1972). 
 38 Collective Bargaining Agreements in Sports: How Do They Work in the United 
States vs. Europe, MONEY SMART ATHLETE BLOG (Aug. 29, 2018), 
http://moneysmartathlete.com/2018/08/29/collective-bargaining-agreements-in-sports-
how-do-they-work-in-the-united-states-vs-europe/ [http://perma.cc/8QCF-FVLU]. 
 39 See Travis Lee, Competitive Balance in the National Football League After the 
1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement, 11 J. SPORTS & ECON. 77, 78 (2010); see generally 
Sam McCaig, From the draft to the NHL: A round-by-round look at the league’s skaters 
and goalies, HOCKEY NEWS (Oct. 21, 2018), http://thehockeynews.com/news/article/from-
the-draft-to-the-nhl-a-round-by-round-look-at-the-leagues-skaters-and-goalies 
[http://perma.cc/Y3Q3-J25V]. 
 40 Lee, supra note 39. 
 41 The Rules of the Draft, NFL OPERATIONS, https://operations.nfl.com/journey-to-
the-nfl/the-nfl-draft/the-rules-of-the-draft/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) 
[http://perma.cc/TX63-92Z8]. 
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chance to select first in the draft, with the team that has the 
worst record given the highest probability to earn the right to 
select first.42 Both of these systems seek to provide the  
least-successful teams in a given year with the opportunity to 
turn their franchise fortunes around by selecting higher-rated 
prospects that are available through the draft. 
In an effort to allow teams to retain their top-tier talent and 
remain competitive, collective bargaining agreements also 
include restraints on player movement. In the early days of 
sports, perpetual reserve clauses allowed teams to retain the 
services of their players indefinitely until they were released 
from their obligations by the team.43 In modern sports, where 
perpetual reserve clauses have been abolished, players are under 
club control for a set period of years before hitting “free agency.”44 
It is at this point that a player can then decide on their own 
where they wish to take their services.45 Many players elect to 
spend their entire career with one organization, but many also 
choose to explore the market and peddle their skills elsewhere 
upon satisfying their obligations under their respective 
contracts.46 
In addition, league collective bargaining agreements also 
implement a salary control tool that is more or less exclusive to 
American sports: the salary cap. The NFL47 and NHL48 are both 
governed by a “hard” salary cap, which operates by setting the 
upper limit of player salaries that a team is permitted to spend in 
a given league year.49 These salary control devices aim to foster 
an environment of parity in American sports by preventing 
teams with deeper pockets from monopolizing high-end talent in 
the league, empowering franchises in smaller markets to obtain 
 
 42 See Adam Kimelman, 2019 NHL Draft Lottery Will Determine First Three Teams 
to Pick, NHL (Apr. 8, 2019), http://www.nhl.com/news/2019-nhl-draft-lottery-faq/c-
306581364 [http://perma.cc/AY7U-RMLZ]. 
 43 Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the Reserve 
System to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS L. J. 21, 22–25 (2008). 
 44 Id. at 44. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. at 56–57. 
 47 Grant Gordon, NFL salary cap for 2019 season set at $188.2M, NFL (Mar. 1, 2019, 
5:37 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000001020137/article/nfl-salary-cap-for-
2019-season-set-at-1882m [http://perma.cc/JJ85-LZNM] (“Officially, the salary cap for 
2019 will be $188.2 million . . .”). 
 48 Dan Rosen, NHL announces salary cap for next season, NHL (June 22, 2019), 
http://www.nhl.com/news/nhl-announces-salary-cap-for-2019-20-season/c-308008530 
[http://perma.cc/GTH3-QQZ4] (“The NHL salary cap for the 2019-20 season will be $81.5 
million . . .”). 
 49 Jim Pagels, Are Salary Caps for Professional Athletes Fair?, PRICEONOMICS (Aug. 
19, 2014), http://www.priceonomics.com/are-salary-caps-for-professional-athletes-fair/ 
[http://perma.cc/MJP8-SFPG].  
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player services, and allowing overall league prosperity by 
encouraging reasonable competitiveness.50 
The salary control exhibited in American sports can be 
contrasted with the five major European soccer leagues: England’s 
Premier League, Italy’s Serie A, Spain’s La Liga, Germany’s 
Bundesliga, and France’s Ligue 1, which all lack a salary cap or 
luxury tax structure, resulting in staggering salary inequality.51 In 
2018, a survey examining salary inequality was conducted based on 
the average first-team salaries of teams in major professional sports 
leagues.52 From these salaries a fairness metric was created: a ratio 
calculated by taking the average first-team salaries of the highest 
spender in a respective league and dividing it by the amount spent by 
the lowest spender.53  
Of the eighteen leagues studied in the survey, the major 
European soccer leagues occupied five of the seven lowest 
rankings in salary inequality based on the fairness metric.54 
American sports, with their salary caps and luxury tax 
provisions, all ranked in the top half of fairness metric rankings 
in that same study.55 If the raw “fairness metric” ratios are 
compared, the gap is increasingly apparent: each North 
American sport has a ratio of less than 4:1, while the Premier 
League is the only European league with a ratio of less than 
10:1.56 Each of the other four European leagues double the ratio 
seen in the Premier League.57 
It would appear that the strive for parity in American sports 
through salary control devices has been largely successful. Of the 
forty major American championships in the last decade, 70% 
have been won by unique teams.58 In the major European soccer 
 
 50 What is a Salary Cap in Sports?, UNIV. KAN. (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://onlinesportmanagement.ku.edu/community/salary-caps-in-sports, 
[http://perma.cc/TN32-9E7H]. 
 51 See generally Global Sports Salaries Survey 2018, SPORTING INTEL. (Nov. 25, 
2018), http://www.globalsportssalaries.com/GSSS%202018.pdf [http://perma.cc/KQX9-
GCJ7].  
 52 Id. at 8. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See infra Appendix A. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See generally NBA & ABA Champions, BASKETBALL REF., http://www.basketball-
reference.com/playoffs/ [http://perma.cc/2SY6-CRR5] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); 
NHL/WHA Playoffs, HOCKEY REF., http://www.hockey-reference.com/playoffs/ 
[http://perma.cc/U9EP-LN9V] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); Pro Football & NFL History, PRO 
FOOTBALL REF., http://www.pro-football-reference.com/years/ [http://perma.cc/K6HW-
RHWT] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); World Series and MLB Playoffs, BASEBALL REF., 
http://www.baseball-reference.com/postseason/ [http://perma.cc/QZ92-JR72] (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2019) (calculations conducted by author and correct as of May 18, 2020). 
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leagues that lack the competitive balance measures of American 
sports, that number drops to 34%.59 
C. Consequences of Collective Bargaining Failures and 
Dissatisfaction 
1. Lockouts/Strikes 
Ultimately, the role of a collective bargaining agreement is to 
get the players out onto the field, ice, or court. Due to the  
high-risk nature of professional sports competition and the large 
considerations involved in each league’s collective bargaining 
agreement, negotiations can be hostile and lead to lockouts 
instituted by owners or strikes instituted by players’ unions.60 
The most notable lockout from a fan and media perspective was 
the 2011 NFL lockout, which lasted from March 12, 2011 until 
August 4, 2011 and garnered around-the-clock coverage on major 
sports news outlets.61 The NBA experienced a 161-day work 
stoppage during roughly that same time period when the owners 
locked the players out from July 1, 2011 to December 8, 2011.62  
In August of 1994, MLB players instituted a strike mid-season 
that caused the loss of over 900 scheduled games—including the 
entirety of the 1994 playoffs.63 The strike was eventually resolved in 
April of the following year after 232 days of labor tensions.64 The 
NHL is infamously known as the only North American professional 
sports league to forego an entire season due to a labor dispute.65 The 
NHL lost the 2004–2005 season to a lockout before the NHL and the 
National Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”) finally 
 
 59 See generally Bundesliga Seasons, FB REF, 
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/20/history/Bundesliga-Seasons [http://perma.cc/F7RC-RTMB] 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019); La Liga Seasons, FB REF, 
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/12/history/La-Liga-Seasons [http://perma.cc/7CYU-3HD2] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019); Ligue 1 Seasons, FB REF, 
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/13/history/Ligue-1-Seasons [http://perma.cc/74XJ-NHGZ] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019); Premier League Seasons, FB REF, 
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/9/history/Premier-League-Seasons [http://perma.cc/Y3RP-
MR56] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); Serie A Seasons, FB REF, 
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/11/history/Serie-A-Seasons [http://perma.cc/X7KJ-AYX3] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019) (calculations conducted by author). 
 60 See Alex Remington, Lockouts, Strikes, And Labor Politics In Pro Sports, 
FOOTNOTE (June 5, 2013), http://footnote.co/lockouts-strikes-and-labor-politics-in-pro-
sports/ [http://perma.cc/7C9D-VL76]. 
 61 See generally CNN Library, Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/index.html 
[http://perma.cc/P7UJ-RZA3] (last updated June 4, 2020, 1:18 PM). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. 
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agreed to a six-year collective bargaining agreement in July of 2005.66 
After extending the agreement for one additional season, the NHL 
owners again locked out the players in September of 2012, causing 
the truncation of the 2012–2013 NHL season.67  
2. Player Dissatisfaction–The Holdout 
Unfortunately for owners, players, and fans of sports, a 
ratified collective bargaining agreement does not ensure 
harmony for the duration of the agreement. Players who are 
unsatisfied with their contract terms (e.g., contract length, base 
salary, performance incentive bonuses, or guaranteed money) 
often holdout for a more lucrative contract.68 A “holdout” is sports 
industry terminology for a player’s refusal to continue playing 
under the terms of a previously agreed-upon deal.69 Holdouts are 
becoming increasingly common in professional sports and 
ultimately impact not only the team that is losing the services of 
a player, but also the perception of the team and league in the 
eyes of sponsors, advertisers, and fans.70  
In addition to the competitive balance and overall salary 
restraints detailed above, recent collective bargaining 
agreements have implemented additional provisions that put 
restrictions on the negotiable terms in rookie contracts.71 The 
restrictions include detailing and limiting the maximum salary 
payable under a rookie contract, fixing the length of years that a 
player must sign for under their first contract, and providing 
movement restrictions following the end of that first contract.72 
With the average career length varying from “three to five years,” 
players realize that there is a sense of urgency to earn their fair 
share during the very brief window they have before injuries 
inevitably take a toll.73 As a result of this short earning potential, 
 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See Jack Bechta, Why Players Hold Out, NAT’L FOOTBALL POST, 
http://nationalfootballpost.com/why-players-hold-out/ [http://perma.cc/DL4C-N68H] (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2020). 
 69 Jacob Salow, Holdouts, Lockouts, and Payouts: The National Football League’s 
Bargaining Power Phenomenon, 43 L. & PSYCH. REV. 239, 240 (2019). 
 70 Peter B. Kupelian & Brian R. Salliotte, The Use of Mediation for Resolving Salary 
Disputes in Sports, 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 383, 391 (1999). 
 71 See Blake Yagman, The Weekly Legal Brief: Breaking Down NFL Rookie 
Contracts, FRONT OFFICE SPORTS (May 4, 2018), http://www.frntofficesport.com/the-
weekly-legal-brief-breaking-down-nfl-rookie-contracts/ [http://perma.cc/PEB9-Y3DX]. 
 72 See generally Nat’l Football League, supra note 5; Nat’l Hockey League, Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 2012–2022 at Art. 9, 
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/PQ5N-KV87] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 73 Brown, supra note 10; see also Dave Siebert, M.D., The Impact of Modern Medicine 
on the NFL, BLEACHER REP. (May 16, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1639848-
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a “majority of holdouts” occur when players are in the later 
stages of their rookie, or entry-level, contracts.74 These players 
are on team-friendly deals by virtue of being locked into the 
restrictive terms set by the collective bargaining agreements of 
the NFL and NHL.75 Oftentimes the teams wish to keep the 
player for longer but are in no rush to sign the player prior to 
their deal ending and while the player is under team control on 
less-expensive contracts.76 
D. NFL and NHL Collective Bargaining History 
Before one can understand the gravity and significance of 
the terms and conditions of the current collective bargaining 
agreements in the NFL and NHL, it is important to take a brief 
look back at past agreements that have been negotiated between 
ownership and players’ associations. These agreements have 
paved the way for the current collective bargaining relationship 
between players’ associations and ownership and provide 
valuable insight into the circumstances that led to the current 
agreements. 
1. Past NFL Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Although collective bargaining in the NFL has been around 
since 196877, it was the 1993 agreement that was heralded as “a 
groundbreaking CBA that set the framework for every NFL CBA 
since.”78 The success of the 1993 CBA was evident when that 
agreement was extended three times—in 1998, 2001, and  
2006—without any strikes, lockouts, or litigation between the 
parties ensuing.79 The latest renewal of the 1993 CBA saw the 
agreement last until 2011, at which point the NFL and NFLPA 




CML6] (noting the progress that modern medicine has made regarding injury research in 
sports and stating that “[t]he medical community now knows that concussions carry not 
only short-term, but also long-term, consequences. The age of ‘shaking off’ a blow to the 
head is forever over.”). 
 74 Jason Fitzgerald, Looking at the NFL Training Camp Holdouts, OVER CAP (July 
29, 2019), http://www.overthecap.com/nfl-training-camp-holdouts/ [http://perma.cc/3K7L-
72KH].  
 75 See Yagman, supra note 71. 
 76 See Fitzgerald, supra note 74. 
 77 See NFL labor history since 1968, supra note 22. 
 78 Chris Deubert, et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011 
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012). 
 79 See id. at 13. 
 80 See id. at 14. 
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The rookie compensation scheme that we see today was a 
contentious issue in the 2011 negotiations.81 Teams had begun 
choosing to give high-profile rookie players significant amounts of 
money82, money that some felt was out of balance, believing that 
the money should instead be used to pay proven veterans.83 
2. Past NHL Collective Bargaining Agreements 
The 1995 NHL collective bargaining agreement (“1995 CBA”) 
was the first to implement a cap on entry-level players or, as the 
agreement referred to them, “Group I players.”84 The 1995 CBA 
placed a prescribed contract length based on the age a player was 
when they signed their entry-level contract.85 Players between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were signed for a period of 
three years; players between the ages of twenty-two and  
twenty-three were signed for a period of two years; players that 
were twenty-four were signed for a period of one year, and there 
was no required number of years for players aged twenty-five or 
older, and those players were not in the entry-level system.86  
The 1995 CBA also delineated the maximum NHL 
compensation that a player could earn that was contingent on 
the year they were drafted into the NHL.87 The amount of any 
“signing, reporting and roster bonuses” was limited to no more 
than 50% of the maximum compensation allowed under Section 
9.3(a).88 Although the imposition of a salary cap on entry-level 
players was a “supposed major victor[y] for the league,”89 a 
loophole existed that was exploited by savvy player agents.90 
Article 9.3(c) of the agreement stated that “nothing contained in 
this Section 9.3 shall be deemed to limit the amount permitted to 
be paid to any Group I Player in respect of any Exhibit 5 
 
 81 See id. at 53. 
 82 Rams give Bradford 50M guaranteed, ESPN (July 31, 2010, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=5425041 [http://perma.cc/SD89-TYJL].  
 83 See Mawae: Big Rookie Contracts Like Ryans’ ‘Disheartening’, ESPN (May 21, 
2008, 4:43 PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3406508 [http://perma.cc/4HMQ-
E8D3]. 
 84 See James Wilton Baillie, An Examination of the Causes behind the Escalation of 
Player Compensation Between 1994 and 2004 Leading to the 2004–05 NHL Lockout, 
QUEEN’S UNIV. INDUS. REL. CTR., 33 (August 2005), https://irc.queensu.ca/wp-
content/uploads/articles/articles_investigation-into-the-collective-bargaining-relationship-
between-nhl-nhlpa-1994-2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/GPQ2-V6LQ]. 
 85 See Nat’l Hockey League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 1995–2004 at art. 
9.1(b), (Jan. 13, 1995) http://www.letsgopens.com/nhl_cba-old.php?id=1 
[http://perma.cc/5FJU-ZWTX]. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See infra Appendix B. 
 88 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 85 art. 9.3(b). 
 89 Baillie, supra note 84, at 33. 
 90 Id. at 34. 
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Performance Bonus(es).”91 Among other things, Exhibit 5 allowed 
bonuses for meeting performance metrics such as ice time, goals 
scored, assists scored, and points scored.92 
After a lockout caused the loss of the 2004–2005 NHL 
season, the NHL and NHLPA agreed on the 2005 collective 
bargaining agreement (“2005 CBA”).93 Most notably, the 2005 
CBA was the first NHL CBA to include an overall salary cap on 
team salaries.94 Like the 1995 CBA, the 2005 CBA also included 
the same prescribed length for entry-level contracts95 and an 
entry-level compensation maximum based on the year in which 
the player was drafted,96 although the compensation figure was 
scaled down dramatically from 1995 CBA figures.97 A notable 
difference in the 2005 CBA was a stricter limitation on the 
signing and games-played bonus: Section 9.3(b) removed the 
reporting and roster bonuses, allowed entry-level players to only 
earn a signing and games-played bonus, and capped said bonuses 
at 10% of the player’s Section 9.3(a) compensation.98 
 
III. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: BAD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS 
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT ROOKIES 
A. Labor Law and Antitrust Exemptions in Sports 
Antitrust law and collective bargaining—through federal 
labor law—are concepts that are in direct conflict with one 
another.99 Simply put, “antitrust law promotes competition while 
labor law endorses activities that restrict it.”100 The Sherman 
Act, the main federal antitrust statute states: “Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is 
declared to be illegal.”101 The NFL and NHL—and other North 
 
 91 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 85, at art. 9.3(c). 
 92 See id. at Exhibit 5. 
 93 See generally CNN Library, supra note 61. 
 94 See Nat’l Hockey League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2005–12 at art. 
50.5(b), (July 22, 2005), http://www.letsgopens.com/NHL-2005-CBA.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/S7M2-JF2A]. 
 95 Id. at art. 9.1(b). 
 96 See infra Appendix C. 
 97 Compare infra Appendix B with Appendix C. 
 98 See Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 94, at art 9.3(a)–(b). This number was down 
from the 50% allowable under the 1995 CBA. 
 99 See Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 100 Antitrust Law – Nonstatutory Labor Exemption – Second Circuit Exempts NFL 
Eligibility Rules from Antitrust Scrutiny – Clarett v. National Football League, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1379, 1379 (2005). 
 101 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
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American sports leagues—are, by their very nature, violations of 
antitrust laws.102 The teams in these leagues “must cooperate on 
a business level to maintain competitive balance between them 
[and b]y cooperating economically instead of competing with one 
another, clubs are apparently violating antitrust laws.”103 This 
dichotomy has been addressed and minimized in two ways: the 
“statutory labor exemption”—codified as the Norris LaGuardia 
Act and Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act—and the “non-
statutory labor exemption.”104  
In Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and 
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the statutory labor exemption statutes to mean that “labor 
unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
and exempt[s] specific union activities . . . from the operation of 
the antitrust laws.”105 The non-statutory labor exemption was 
first explored in the sports capacity in Mackey v. National 
Football League.106 In Mackey, NFL players brought an antitrust 
challenge against the so-called Rozelle Rule, which permitted the 
Commissioner of the NFL to compensate a team losing the 
services of a player that was previously under contract with the 
said team by “nam[ing] and then award[ing] to the former club 
one or more players . . . of the acquiring club as the 
Commissioner in his sole discretion deem[ed] fair and 
equitable.”107 The Rozelle Rule was instituted not through 
collective bargaining, but was instead adopted by league owners 
as a unilateral amendment to the NFL Constitution.108 
The Mackey court described the appropriateness of the  
non-statutory labor exemption by developing a three-prong 
test.109 In order for the non-statutory labor exemption to apply, 
the restraint must (1) primarily affect only the parties to the 
collective bargaining agreement, (2) be a mandatory subject of 
collective bargaining, and (3) be the product of bona fide arm’s 
length bargaining.110 The court ruled that the Rozelle Rule met 
prongs one and two of the non-statutory exemption test, but 
failed on prong three as the court found the Rozelle Rule was not 
 
 102 See Leah Farzin, On the Antitrust Exemption for Professional Sports in the United 
States and Europe, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L. J. 75, 75 (2015). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Feldman, supra note 25, at 8. 
 105 Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 
U.S. 616, 622 (1975). 
 106 Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 107 Id. at 610–11. 
 108 Id. at 610. 
 109 Id. at 614. 
 110 Id. 
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the product of arm’s length negotiation.111 In its opinion, the 
court stated that the Rule was unilaterally implemented by team 
owners prior to any collective bargaining agreement between 
league ownership and the players’ union and found that there 
was a lack of sufficient evidence that the union had received 
reciprocal consideration.112 Following the Eighth Circuit, a 
number of lower district courts and sister circuit courts adopted 
the Mackey test as the barometer for the non-statutory labor 
exemption.113 
The Supreme Court took up the non-statutory labor 
exemption in the sports context in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., and 
closed up the holes that the statutory labor exemption did not 
immediately address.114 Brown involved a challenge to the NFL’s 
creation of a “developmental squad” of players that “would play in 
practice games and sometimes in regular games as substitutes for 
injured players.”115 When the players’ association and the NFL 
could not agree on the wages and benefits of the development 
squad, the league unilaterally implemented the last best 
proposal.116 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Breyer 
succinctly stated the aim and purpose of the non-statutory labor 
exemption, stating:  
As a matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require 
groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the 
same time to forbid them to make among themselves or with each 
other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially 
necessary to make the process work or its results mutually acceptable. 
Thus, the implicit exemption recognized that, to give effect to federal 
labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective bargaining 
to take place some restraints on competition imposed through the 
bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions.117 
A particularly noteworthy sports antitrust case is  
Clarett v. National Football League, wherein Maurice Clarett, a 
former standout running back at Ohio State University, 
challenged the NFL’s draft eligibility rules that required hopeful 
NFL players to wait three full football seasons after high school 
graduation before the player would be eligible to enter the NFL 
 
 111 Id. at 615–16. 
 112 Id. at 616. 
 113 See, e.g., Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 
1987); Cont’l Mar., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th 
Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Wood v. 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Zimmerman v. Nat’l 
Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403–04 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 114 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
 115 Id. at 234. 
 116 Id. at 235. 
 117 Id. at 237 (emphasis in original). 
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Draft.118 Clarett was the first freshman to be listed as the 
starting running back for Ohio State since 1943, and he did not 
disappoint as he led the Buckeyes to a national championship 
that season.119 Unfortunately for Clarett, that is where the 
positives stopped. Clarett was accused of receiving “preferential 
treatment” from Ohio State administrators,120 “charged with 
misdemeanor falsification” of a police report,121 and eventually 
suspended by Ohio State and the NCAA for accepting improper 
benefits before he played a single snap in his sophomore 
season.122 
After his troubles at Ohio State, Clarett sought to enter the 
2004 NFL Draft despite the NFL’s three-year rule.123 Clarett, 
who had graduated from high school in December 2001124, posited 
that NFL teams were “horizontal competitors for the labor of 
professional football players and thus may not agree that a 
player will be hired only after three full football seasons . . . .”125 
In overturning the district court, the Second Circuit ruled that 
that the non-statutory labor exemption applied and that Clarett 
did not have antitrust standing to bring his claim, as doing so 
would usurp federal labor law policies.126 Clarett’s writ of 
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court127, and he was 
barred from entering the 2004 NFL Draft.128 After he was forced 
to take a year off from football, Clarett eventually entered the 
2005 NFL Draft where he was drafted 101st overall by the 
 
 118 Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 119 Id. at 126. 
 120 See Timeline: The rise and fall of Maurice Clarett, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2545204 [http://perma.cc/QSH4-LK8C] (quoting a 
teaching assistant at Ohio State, who said Clarett “walked out of a midterm exam but 
passed the class after the professor gave him an oral exam.”). 
 121 See id. (stating that, in July of 2003, Clarett had claimed that “more than $10,000 
in clothing, CDs, cash and stereo equipment was stolen in April” from a car Clarett had 
“borrowed from a local dealership.” Less than two month later, he was facing charges for 
falsifying information.). 
 122 See id. (explaining that Ohio State athletic director Andy Geiger suspended 
Clarett one day after Clarett was charged by police, claiming that Clarett had “received 
special benefits worth thousands of dollars from a family friend and repeatedly misled 
investigators). 
 123 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 130. 
 126 Id. at 143. 
 127 Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 
(2005). 
 128 In what can be described as adding insult to injury, when the 2011 NFL/NFLPA 
CBA was passed, Article 6, Section 2(b)–the provision which dealt with the three-year 
draft eligibility rule–gave an example to illustrate the rule with pointed similarities to 
Clarett’s situation: “For example, if a player graduated from high school in December 
2011, he would not be permitted to apply for special eligibility, and would not otherwise 
be eligible for selection, until the 2015 Draft.” Nat’l Football League, supra note 5, at 17. 
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Denver Broncos.129 Clarett was cut by the Broncos before ever 
playing a snap in the NFL.130 
The Clarett case provides some rather pivotal language 
regarding prospective rookie players entering the NFL. Clarett had 
argued that the rules governing eligibility for prospective players 
were “an impermissible bargaining subject” due to their impact on 
those who had not been parties to the agreement, i.e. those college 
football players that were otherwise not members of the NFLPA.131 
In ruling on the eligibility rules, the court stated: “prospective 
players no longer have the right to negotiate directly with the NFL 
teams over the terms and conditions of their employment. That 
responsibility is instead committed to the NFL and the players 
union to accomplish through the collective bargaining process.”132 It 
is well settled that once a group of employees has unionized and 
selected an exclusive bargaining representative, negotiation 
privileges lie with the union and not with individual players.133 
However, the Second Circuit appears to be misconstruing the 
NFLPA’s representation of the prospective players’ interests.134  
The preamble to the NFL/NFLPA collective bargaining 
agreement states that the agreement is between the “National 
Football League Management Council which is recognized as the 
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and 
future employer member Clubs of the National Football League” 
and the “[NFLPA].”135 The NFLPA is the:  
Sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future 
employee players in the NFL in a bargaining unit described as follows:  
1. All professional football players employed by a member club of the 
National Football League;  
2. All professional football players who have been previously employed 
by a member club of the National Football League who are seeking 
employment with an NFL Club;  
 
 129 See 2005 Denver Broncos Draft, FOOTBALL DATABASE, 
http://www.footballdb.com/teams/nfl/denver-broncos/draft/2005 [http://perma.cc/3DVF-
5QQA] (last visited Apr. 3, 2020). 
 130 See John Clayton, Broncos to release Maurice Clarett, ESPN (Aug. 28, 2005), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2145372 [http://perma.cc/7TZZ-SK8B]. 
 131 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140. 
 132 Id. at 138. 
 133 See National Labor Relations Act, supra note 19. 
 134 See Matthew Strauser, Upon Further Review: Reconsidering Clarett and Player 
Access to the NFL, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 247, 250 (2018). 
 135 Nat’l Football League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2020 at xvi, 
http://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-
NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf [http://perma.cc/888P-B2GN] (last visited Mar. 25, 
2020). 
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3. All rookie players once they are selected in the current year’s NFL 
College Draft; and  
4. All undrafted rookie players once they commence negotiation with 
an NFL Club concerning employment as a player.136 
The plain language of the collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated and entered into by NFL Management Council and 
the NFLPA appears to explicitly exclude college players—or any 
other prospective player seeking to enter the league—from 
membership in the players’ association until after they are 
selected in the “College Draft”137 or until they begin negotiations 
with a team following the draft.138 This notion is confirmed by an 
NFL player agent who states that “incoming [NFL] players aren’t 
technically considered a part of the union.”139 On the other hand, 
the NHL/NHLPA CBA preamble states that the agreement is 
“between the National Hockey League . . . which is recognized as 
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the present 
and future Clubs of the NHL, and the National Hockey League 
Players’ Association . . . recognized as the sole and exclusive 
bargaining representative of present and future Players in the 
NHL.”140 
Retired players are on the reciprocal end of the playing 
spectrum from rookies, and it has been said that “the NFLPA 
negotiates with the League on behalf of the active players, and 
the interests of the active players . . . are not consistent with that 
of the retired players insofar as the League offers a single 
compensation pie to the players, such that any slice allocated to 
the retired players results in a smaller slice for the active 
players.”141 Here, a direct comparison can be drawn between the 
interests of the active players and retired players not having 
their interests aligned and veteran (active) players not having 
their interests aligned with entering rookie players, in the same 
sense that any slice allocated to the rookies results in a smaller 
slice for the veteran players.  
 
 136 Id. (emphasis added). 
 137 See id. The NFL-NFLPA CBA uses the phrase “College Draft” to mean the draft 
that a vast majority of players use as their method to enter the league, see discussion in 
Part II infra. 
 138 See id. 
 139 Joel Corry, Agent’s Take: Fixing the rookie wage scale, plus a look at its history 
and how it works, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 24, 2019, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/agents-take-fixing-the-rookie-wage-scale-plus-a-look-
at-its-history-and-how-it-works [http://perma.cc/T5HU-WU4Z]. 
 140 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 72, at 1. 
 141 Eller v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 872 F. Supp. 2d 823, 834 (D. Minn. 
2012). 
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The statutory and non-statutory labor exceptions provide us 
with a glimpse of the preference that labor law, via collective 
bargaining, is given over antitrust law when the two are at odds, 
especially in the sports context.142 This deferment to labor law 
has been shown in numerous sports cases where courts have 
been reluctant to rule in favor of plaintiff-athletes’ antitrust 
claims, instead opining that such claims are better left to the 
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board as provided by 
federal labor law.143 These decisions are “rooted in the 
observation that the relationships among the defendant sports 
leagues and their players were governed by collective bargaining 
agreements and thus were subject to the carefully structured 
regime established by federal labor laws.”144  
B. Current Collective Bargaining Agreements 
With an understanding of applicable antitrust and labor 
laws, it is time to turn to the current collective bargaining 
agreements that govern the NFL and NHL today and examine 
how they limit rookie athletes seeking to enter the league. While 
the overarching goals are the same—establishing a framework 
that details the terms and conditions of employment—collective 
bargaining agreements in sports are as unique as the leagues 
themselves.145 MLB players are not permitted to engage in pro 
boxing, but receive their own room on the road.146 NHL players 
must have established significant service time to receive their 
own room, but receive six months of mortgage or rent coverage if 
they are traded.147 NBA players only receive three months 
coverage if they are traded, but receive extra-long beds and 
porter baggage service on the road.148 NFL players can be fined 
twice a week for being overweight, but cannot be disciplined for 
hair preferences.149 A main point of difference in league collective 
bargaining agreements deals with the terms surrounding the 
rookie, or entry-level, contract.150 
 
 142 Feldman, supra note 25, at 9. 
 143 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting “the 
soup-to-nuts” array of rules and remedies afforded under the labor laws).  
 144 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135. 
 145 See Eric Macramalla, Part 4 in A Series Comparing the CBAs: Weird & Quirky 
Clauses, OFFSIDE SPORTS L. (Jan 31, 2011, 10:59 AM), 
http://offsidesportsblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/part-4-in-series-comparing-cbas-weird.html 
[http://perma.cc/4UH4-55ND]. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See generally Andrew Brandt, The Differences in Rookie Contracts, NAT’L 
FOOTBALL POST, http://nationalfootballpost.com/the-differences-in-rookie-contracts/ 
[http://perma.cc/WJR9-CDRA] (last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
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1. NFL/NFLPA 
The NFLPA and NFL owners reached a new collective 
bargaining agreement on March 15, 2020.151 This new agreement 
comes with one year remaining on the previous deal that was 
entered into in 2011 and runs through the 2030 NFL season.152 
Article 7 of the NFL/NFLPA collective bargaining agreement is 
entitled “Rookie Compensation and Rookie Compensation 
Pool.”153 For the purposes of this Article, the relevant portions of 
Article 7 of the CBA are the “Total Rookie Compensation Pool” 
and the “Year-One Rookie Compensation Pool” as explained in 
Section 2154 and the “Rookie Contract Length” as explained in 
Section 3.155  
Section 2 provides: “For the 2020 League Year, Total Rookie 
Compensation Pool . . . may not exceed $1,430,000,000 [and] The 
Year-One Rookie Compensation Pool . . . shall equal 
$260,000,000.”156 Section 2 continues with a complicated formula 
for computing the increase(s) in the Total Rookie Compensation 
Pool and the Year-One Rookie Compensation Pool.157 In addition 
to the amount of compensation to be afforded under Section 2, 
Section 3 provides: 
Every Rookie Contract shall have a fixed and unalterable contract 
length: (i) four years for Rookies selected in the first round of the 
Draft, with a Club option for a fifth year as described in Section 7 
below; (ii) four years for Rookies selected in rounds two through seven 
of the Draft (including any compensatory draft selections); and (iii) 
three years for Undrafted Rookies.158 
The full NFLPA membership vote on the passage of the new 
2020 NFL/NFLPA collective bargaining agreement was very 
close, passing by a vote of 1,019 to 959.159 The ratification of the 
agreement, which was proposed to the players by team owners, 
was a hot button topic in the football world and one that divided 
players in the league.160 Many in the football community, players 
and pundits alike, thought that the players were giving up too 
 
 151 See Grant Gordon, NFL player vote ratifies new CBA through 2030 season, NFL 
(Mar. 15, 2020, 1:01 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000001106246/article/nfl-
player-vote-ratifies-new-cba-through-2030-season [http://perma.cc/5JHV-R9EX].  
 152 See generally id. 
 153 Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 7. 
 154 Id. at art. 7 § 2. 
 155 Id. at art. 7 § 3. 
 156 Id. at art. 7 § 2. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at art. 7 § 3. 
 159 Gordon, supra note 151. 
 160 See Jordan Heck, NFL CBA vote: Tracking which players are voting ‘yes’ and ‘no’, 
SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020), http://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-cba-vote-
players-tracker-yes-no/dqf1q13xwyau1m40illiiattr [http://perma.cc/22G4-X3DE].  
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much to the owners—including the addition of a 17th regular 
season game—by accepting the very first offer the owners 
proposed.161 
Despite some significant changes to parts of the collective 
bargaining agreement, the structure of the rookie compensation 
article in the new 2020 agreement retains the same substantive 
information that was included in the 2011 agreement, with the 
2020 agreement adding additional language.162 Interestingly, 
some of the players who were the most outspoken against the 
proposed collective bargaining agreement included established 
superstar players such as Russell Wilson, Aaron Rodgers, JJ 
Watt, and Richard Sherman, who felt that the players were being 
taken advantage of by team owners.163 In a tweet to his followers 
indicating his stance on the issue, Russell Wilson drew 
comparisons to the NBA and MLB agreements that put the 
players first and said that “ALL @NFL players deserve the 
same.”164 
2. NHL/NHLPA 
The most recent collective bargaining agreement between 
NHL owners and the NHLPA was ratified on January 12, 
2013.165 Much like the NFL/NFLPA agreement, the NHL/NHLPA 
agreement places strict guidelines on rookie contracts, or “entry 
level” contracts as they are referred to by the NHL.166 Unlike the 
NFL, the NHL determines the length of an entry-level contract 
based on the player’s age when the contract is signed.167 The 
signing age parameters are the same as they have been in the 
previous two NHL CBAs: players between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-one are signed for three years; players between the 
 
 161 See generally id.; Dan Graziano, NFL CBA approved: What players get in new 
deal, how expanded playoffs and schedule will work, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2020), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28901832/nfl-cba-approved-players-get-new-deal-how-
expanded-playoffs-schedule-work [http://perma.cc/9M6U-U6N7]. 
 162 Compare Nat’l Football League, supra note 5, with Nat’l Football League, supra 
note 135 at art. 7 (showing that additions were made to the 2020 agreement that were not 
present in the 2011, primarily in the form of the calculations used to compute the relevant 
figures discussed; dates used in the 2011 agreement were updated to reflect the new time 
frame that would be covered by the 2020 agreement and baseline dollar amounts were 
updated to reflect the new financial position of the NFL and NFLPA at the time the 2020 
agreement was proposed and agreed upon.). 
 163 Jordan Heck, NFL players think the proposed CBA by owners is awful: 'Rip it up!', 
SPORTING NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), http://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-players-
cba-owners/jcr7tof3e21s15wjh4bqzbo3h [http://perma.cc/LPD4-RZ99]. 
 164 Russell Wilson (@DangeRussWilson), TWITTER (Feb. 26, 2020, 7:16 AM), 
http://twitter.com/DangeRussWilson/status/1232685882915872769. 
 165 Union ratifies new CBA, NHL (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nhl.com/news/union-
ratifies-new-cba/c-649889 [http://perma.cc/M6XV-JGR6]. 
 166 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 72, at 23. 
 167 Id. 
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ages of twenty-two and twenty-three are signed for two years; 
players who are twenty-four are signed for one year, and players 
twenty-five and older are not subject to the entry-level system.168 
For age calculation purposes, a player’s age is determined as of 
his “age on September 15 of the calendar year in which he signs 
[a contract], regardless of his actual age on the date he signs.”169  
Unlike the formula used by the NFL/NFLPA, the 
NHL/NHLPA collective bargaining agreement allots a set 
compensation based on the year the player was drafted, with no 
consideration to where in the draft the player was taken.170 
Players drafted in 2005 or 2006 receive $850,000 per year; players 
drafted in 2007 or 2008 receive $875,000 per year; players drafted 
in 2009 or 2010 receive $900,000 per year, and players drafted 
from 2011 to 2022, the entire length that this collective bargaining 
agreement covers, will receive $925,000 per year under their 
entry-level contract.171  
C. Rookie and Entry-Level Players are Not Adequately 
Represented 
When it comes time to negotiate with the leagues and 
their ownership groups on collective bargaining agreements, 
players’ associations turn to their leadership: the executive 
board and the player representatives from each league team.172 
Every NFL and NHL team elects one player representative to 
serve on their respective players’ association.173 The tables in 
Appendix D and Appendix E detail the designated player 
representative for each NFL and NHL team, respectively.174 
The column on the far right side of each table indicates the 
number of years that the player has been in the league for 
purposes of determining if that particular player is on their 
rookie, or entry-level, contract.175  
 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 24. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 24–25. 
 172 See generally Chris Bumbaca, What we know about proposed NFL collective 
bargaining agreement, timeline of talks, USA TODAY (Feb. 26 2020, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2020/02/26/nfl-collective-bargaining-agreement-
facts-deal-details-players-association/4878534002/ [http://perma.cc/S9PG-5PSU].  
 173 See Board of Player Representatives, NFL PLAYERS’ ASSOC., 
http://www.nflpa.com/about/nflpa-officers#board [http://perma.cc/X9T7-QMUS] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2020); see also Executive Board, NHL PLAYERS’ ASSOC., 
http://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/executive-board [http://perma.cc/9SE9-8YD8] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2020). 
 174 See infra Appendix D; see also infra Appendix E. 
 175 See infra Appendix D; see also infra Appendix E. 
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NFL teams most recently selected their player 
representatives in the fall of 2018.176 Of the players serving as 
player representatives for NFL teams, only one of the thirty-two 
player representatives—Ronnie Stanley of the Baltimore 
Ravens—was playing under the terms of his rookie contract 
when he was selected to be a player representative.177 Christian 
Wilkins, the youngest player representative in terms of years of 
experience, was not yet drafted as a member of the Miami 
Dolphins during the last general election for player 
representatives,178 but was selected when the original Dolphins 
player representative and alternates were traded or released 
from the team.179 Of the NHL player representatives, only one of 
the thirty-one player representatives—Brady Tkachuk of the 
Ottawa Senators—is playing under the terms of his entry-level 
contract.180 Although Matt Roy of the Los Angeles Kings is only 
in his third season in the NHL, he signed his entry-level contract 
at age 22 and thus that contract had a two-year term.181  
Both the NFLPA and NHLPA Constitutions codify this 
barrier to player representation in their association bylaws. The 
NFLPA Constitution requires that “[i]n order to be eligible for 
election or temporary appointment as a Player Representative or 
Co-Alternate Player Representative, a person must have been a 
member in good standing of the NFLPA for at least one (1) year 
prior to his election or appointment.”182 The NHLPA Constitution 
 
 176 See Board of Player Representatives, supra note 173. 
 177 See infra Appendix D. 
 178 Christian Wilkins, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/prospects/christian-wilkins/32195749-
4c08-1088-ad8a-aada01ec7ce9 [http://perma.cc/4WNN-HLA2] (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) 
(showing that Wilkins was drafted with the 13th overall pick in the 2019 NFL Draft). 
 179 See NFLPA (@NFLPA), TWITTER (Oct. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
http://twitter.com/NFLPA/status/1054039680197509121 [http://perma.cc/CA3J-AGVM]; see 
also Herbie Teope, Dallas Cowboys trade for Dolphins DE Robert Quinn, NFL (Mar. 28, 
2019, 3:28 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/dallas-cowboys-trade-for-dolphins-de-robert-quinn-
0ap3000001024615 [http://perma.cc/QAF9-LL8K]; see also Josh Alper, Dolphins release Ted 
Larsen, Andre Branch, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Mar. 7, 2019, 4:18 PM), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2019/03/07/dolphins-release-ted-larsen-andre-branch/ 
[http://perma.cc/NLY6-DXUQ]; see also Kevin Nogle, Dolphins cut John Denney, SB NATION 
(Sept. 2, 2019, 10:14 AM), http://www.thephinsider.com/2019/9/2/20844435/dolphins-cut-
john-denney [http://perma.cc/6R45-GQSZ]; see also Kevin Patra, Texans trade for Dolphins’ 
Laremy Tunsil, Kenny Stills, NFL (Aug. 31, 2019, 7:24 AM), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/texans-trade-for-dolphins-laremy-tunsil-kenny-stills-
0ap3000001045889 [http://perma.cc/6FVD-92H4]. 
 180 See infra Appendix E. 
 181 Matt Roy, CAPFRIENDLY, http://www.capfriendly.com/players/matt-roy 
[http://perma.cc/96L3-F5JB] (explaining that Roy’s 2019–20 contract was negotiated 
freely by him and his agent). 
 182 NFL Players Ass’n Constitution, NFL PLAYERS’ ASS’N (Mar. 2017), 
http://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/NFLPAConstitution2017.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/CL5Y-ZPCY]. 
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takes this even further by requiring that player representatives 
must “have been on an NHL Club roster for at least 160 games.”183  
The discrepancy in the years of experience is undoubtedly 
apparent when it comes to the bargaining tables and the 
collective bargaining agreements that result therefrom. As was 
discussed in Part II.B, the salary cap structure of the NFL and 
the NHL exists to promote parity in the leagues and to avoid the 
wealthier teams from overspending.184 With that limiting number 
in mind, there is only a finite amount of money that teams are 
permitted to spend. Limiting the compensation that is permitted 
to be paid to players entering the league guarantees that there is 
a higher percentage of the salary cap to be had by the veteran 
players. Without equality of representation on either the player 
representative staff or the association executive boards, there are 
no incentives for the interests of the continuous stream of 
incoming talent. To be certain, those that serve as veterans 
realize the inequality that they had to overcome as rookies, and 
now that they are in a more preferential position, they are 
certainly not going to give up less of their own rights to benefit 
the incoming class. Inevitably, that cycle repeats itself in 
perpetuity.  
D. Unequal Position Runs Afoul of Policy Concerns Behind the 
Passage of the NLRA  
Ingrained in the passage of the NLRA were underlying policy 
concerns that justify such action.185 In enacting the NLRA, 
Congress realized that inherent differences in the “bargaining 
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of 
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are 
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership 
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of 
commerce . . . by depressing wage rates.”186 It was well 
understood that protecting employees’ rights to organize was 
important to the commerce and the hopes of resolving disputes 
that arose between employers and employees.187 
 




(last visited May 4, 2020). 
 184 See Collective Bargaining Agreements in Sports, supra note 38. 
 185 See 29 U.S.C. §151 (2018). 
 186 Id. 
 187 See id. 
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The policy concerns were not solely limited to protection of 
employees but included protection from unwanted practices by 
unions.188 In realizing that labor unions could take damaging 
action like employers, it was said: 
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some 
labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the 
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing 
the free flow of goods in such commerce through . . . concerted 
activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of 
such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary 
condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed. It is hereby 
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes 
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce.189 
However, despite these issues being plainly obvious over 
eighty years ago, it is these very practices that are rearing their 
heads today and causing the exact havoc that was sought to be 
eliminated. The NFLPA and NHLPA, through their 
representation comprised almost entirely of veteran players no 
longer concerned with the plight of the rookie, have engaged in 
practices that have the “effect of burdening or obstructing 
commerce” by preventing the free flow of goods—in this context, 
players services—through their unreasonable control of rookie 
salaries.190 The plain language of the NLRA indicating the policy 
justifications for a lack of “obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce” can certainly be found to extend to services where 
those services themselves form the basis of the commerce in 
question.191 
IV. GOOD FAITH BARGAINING AND FAIR REPRESENTATION FOR ALL 
In order for there to be true pay equity in these professional 
sports leagues, the arbitrary maximum cap placed on rookie or 
entry-level contracts must be abolished. This Article proposes 
that any restrictions on rookie or entry-level contract earnings be 
abolished in any new collective bargaining agreements moving 
forward. This is not to suggest that every rookie or entry-level 
player should be making comparable salaries to those proven 
veterans, but rather that they have the ability to do so and are 
not otherwise unduly burdened by a blanket cap on their 
contracts merely based on their tenure status.  
 
 188 See id. 
 189 Id. (emphasis added). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See generally id. 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 9:05 AM 
328 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:1 
This Article is hardly the first to propose that the rookie 
wage structure, as it is currently structured, needs re-working.192 
The rookie wage structure that is now in place has been called 
“an overcorrection to how incoming players were previously 
compensated.”193 It has previously been suggested that the 
amount of time an NFL player is under his rookie contract can be 
shortened by one year—moving from five years to four years for 
first-round picks, from four to three years for other draftees, and 
from three to two years for undrafted players.194 Under previous 
proposals, players would be able to renegotiate their rookie 
contracts one year earlier and the negotiation window would 
open following the second year of the contract, as opposed to the 
third.195 However, these minor tweaks to an already-broken 
system do not adequately fix the problem and also discount the 
tremendous success that players on rookie or entry-level 
contracts are having in recent years. 
The NFL’s role in this rookie wage problem is two-fold. First, 
the discussion in Part III.A above shows that there appears to be 
a very strong case that college athletes or other prospective NFL 
players are in fact not members of the NFLPA. This would 
appear to open the possibility that antitrust claims, potentially 
brought by the prospective players, would not be protected by the 
non-statutory labor exemption, based on the tests that circuit 
courts have developed in past opinions. Second, and 
alternatively, if the prospective players are deemed to be subject 
to the conditions of the CBA, the disparate treatment that they 
receive by virtue of being a new player in the league should be a 
ripe scenario for a duty of fair representation claim with the 
NLRB. The NFLPA is far from a bargaining unit that is above 
reproach and a recent claim by current NFL player Russell 
Okung accuses NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith 
with making threats of retaliation regarding players being 
outspoken against the recently ratified 2020 NFL/NFLPA 
CBA.196 
 
 192 See generally Corry, supra note 139; Joel Corry, Agent’s Take: Here’s how the NFL 
would look if the rookie wage scale didn’t exist, CBS Sports (Apr. 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/agents-take-heres-how-the-nfl-would-look-if-the-
rookie-wage-scale-didnt-exist/ [http://perma.cc/UQF4-B33W]. 
 193 Corry, supra note 192. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 See Gregg E. Clifton, NFL Players Association Executive Committee Member Files 
ULP Against Own Union and Its Leaders, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2020), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/nfl-players-association-executive-committee-
member-files-ulp-against-own-union-and [http://perma.cc/Q475-AP7X]. 
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Young NFL and NHL players entering the league are not 
given adequate representation to ensure that their needs have a 
fair shot of being met and, in fact, history has provided us with 
examples of the exact opposite: player representatives are 
explicitly outspoken in their desire to throttle down the earning 
capacity of select members of the group they are elected to 
represent, merely because they are new to the league.197 This is 
quite clearly a breach of the duty of fair representation and the 
“statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members 
without hostility or discrimination toward any.”198 Instead of 
focusing on pumping up veteran players and their salaries by 
evidencing how they have proven themselves, the NFLPA and 
NHLPA seem intent on bringing rookie compensation down in a 
manner akin to the “cycles of abuse” of hazing where “members 
model for new members the accepted methods for initiation” 
which—in this scenario—is artificially throttled salaries.199  
Whatever the initial reasons or justifications for the rookie 
salaries in both the NFL and NHL, there are even stronger 
arguments for its removal. Rookie players are enjoying 
tremendous success in recent years, winning awards for both 
league200 and Super Bowl most valuable player honors.201 One 
need look no further than MLB for a sports world example with 
no maximum rookie contracts.202 MLB, as mentioned earlier in 
this Article, does not have a hard salary cap and there is also no 
 
 197 See Mawae: Big Rookie Contracts Like Ryans’ ‘Disheartening’, supra note 83; see 
generally Liz Mullen, The making of a union, SPORTS BUS. J. (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2017/01/23/Labor-and-
Agents/NHLPA.aspx [http://perma.cc/9T6R-BX24].  
 198 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
 199 Why do groups haze members?, ELON U., 
http://www.elon.edu/u/hazing/facts/theories-research/ [http://perma.cc/D8MC-6QCZ] (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2020).  
 200 AP NFL Most Valuable Player Winners, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, 
http://www.pro-football-reference.com/awards/ap-nfl-mvp-award.htm 
[http://perma.cc/96MY-UYRU] (last visited May 4, 2020) (showing that Cam Newton in 
2015, Patrick Mahomes in 2018 and Lamar Jackson in 2019 were all on their rookie 
contracts when they were voted most valuable player); see also NHL Hart Memorial 
Trophy Winners, HOCKEY REFERENCE, http://www.hockey-
reference.com/awards/hart.html [http://perma.cc/B4MQ-DAX9] (last visited May 4, 2020) 
(showing that Sidney Crosby in 2006–07 and Connor McDavid in 2016–17 were on their 
entry-level contracts when they won the Hart Memorial Trophy for NHL most valuable 
player). 
 201 NFL History – Super Bowl MVPs, ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/superbowl/history/mvps [http://perma.cc/6F2F-LAXN] (last 
visited May 4, 2020) (stating that Von Miller in Super Bowl 50 and Patrick Mahomes in 
Super Bowl LIV were on their rookie contracts when they were awarded Super Bowl most 
valuable player). 
 202 See Andrew Brandt, The Differences in Rookie Contracts, NAT’L FOOTBALL POST, 
http://nationalfootballpost.com/the-differences-in-rookie-contracts/ 
[http://perma.cc/5YHW-LW8U] (last visited May 1, 2020). 
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limit on the amount that teams are permitted to pay their 
incoming players.203 Instead, the MLB league office provides 
clubs with recommendations for signing bonuses and overall 
compensation for rookies.204 These figures are merely suggestions 
that teams can choose to follow or not, but this format does 
provide for highly-talented players entering the league to have a 
fighting chance to earn themselves appropriate money right off 
the bat.205 It is the “truest free-market application to [the] 
selection process, giving players at the top leverage (whether real 
or perceived) to negotiate without any of the parameters imposed 
by the [rookie] caps of the other sports.”206  
A related industry for comparison to professional athletes is 
the television and film industry. Here, like in professional sports, 
the most in-demand talent can be of any age and it is not 
uncommon for younger talent to be wildly successful, sometimes 
even more so than individuals that have been in the business for 
longer periods of time. These television and film personalities are 
represented by the Screen Actors Guild – American Federation of 
Television and Radio Artists (“SAG-AFTRA”).207 SAG-AFTRA is 
the unionized representative body of “approximately 160,000 
actors, announcers . . . and other media professionals.”208 The 
union is responsible for “negotiating the best wages, working 
conditions and health and pension” benefits for its members.209 
Those in charge of movies and television shows are very familiar 
with the salary cap-like implications of their projects: working talent 
salaries under budgets. While the comparison is not completely 
apples-to-apples, there is a logical nexus between the salary caps in 
sports and the budgets that film and television producers must work 
under.210 The sums of money paid to television and film  
talent—including a specialized film industry salary that involves a 
portion of the profits of a film—is said to be “Hollywood’s version of a 
salary cap.”211 Similar to sports contracts, there are a number of 
 
 203 See id. 
 204 See id. 
 205 See id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 About, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/about [http://perma.cc/8EAL-52CB] 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2020). 
 208 Id. 
 209 SAG-AFTRA, Constitution of the Screen Actors Guild – American Federation of 
Television and Radio Artists, 1 (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.sagaftra.org/files/sa_documents/2019%20Constitution%20-
%20Updated%20Rules%202020%201214.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7Z8-4Z5F]. 
 210 Tim Ryan, Who’s who on a film set?, TAR PROD., http://tarproductions.com/whos-
who-on-a-film-set/ [http://perma.cc/D4RU-AQGG] (last visited May 4, 2020). 
 211 John Horn, Hollywood Studios Rewriting Pay System for Their Talent, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-jan-13-fi-gross13-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/955S-CTHZ]. 
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additional benefits that can be negotiated into an actor’s contract.212 
Much like securing a top-end sports talent can favor a franchise on 
the field or at the gate, “[s]ecuring a proven movie star is one way to 
guarantee ticket sales.”213 
One major difference between SAG-AFTRA and the 
NFL/NFLPA and NHL/NHLPA collective bargaining agreements 
deals with compensation. Article XI of the SAG-AFTRA 
Constitution deals with collective bargaining.214 Despite the fact 
that SAG-AFTRA represents union members that must abide by 
the financial restrictions imposed by television and film budgets, 
there is a provision in the union constitution that explicitly 
prevents the union from artificially capping the amount of money 
to be made by a member: Subsection D Article XI states that 
“[t]he Union shall not negotiate or seek to regulate the maximum 
compensation that may be earned by any member under any 
collective bargaining agreement.”215 This is in direct contrast to 
what is present in both the NFL/NFLPA and NHL/NHLPA 
collective bargaining agreements.216 Similar to television and film 
budgets that may vary from project to project, the NFL and NHL 
agreements are both silent on the exact salary cap figure on a 
year-to-year basis.217 However, these agreements both 
specifically limit what certain members of their respective 
unions—rookies or entry-level players—are permitted to make,218 
while providing minimum amounts that preferred members of 
their unions—veteran members—are required to make.219 
An ancillary benefit of allowing rookie or entry-level 
compensation to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis allows the 
players to account for income tax considerations.220 Tax 
implications are a necessary evil of all professional sports 
contracts, but mandating that players be required to earn a 
predetermined amount, regardless of location, does an injustice 
 
 212 Margaret Heidenry, How Hollywood Salaries Really Work, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 12, 
2018), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/02/hollywood-movie-salaries-wage-gap-
equality [http://perma.cc/LD8T-TV4P]. 
 213 Id. 
 214 SAG-AFTRA, supra note 209, at 37. 
 215 Id. at 38. 
 216 See generally Nat’l Football League, supra note 135; Nat’l Hockey League, supra 
note 72. 
 217 See Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 13; Nat’l Hockey League, supra 
note 72, at art. 50. 
 218 See Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 7; Nat’l Hockey League, supra 
note 72, at art. 9. 
 219 See Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 9; Nat’l Hockey League, supra 
note 72, at art. 10. 
 220 Jeff Bowes, Major Penalty for High Taxes, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM 20 (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.taxpayer.com/media/MajorPenalty-October2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/PH9N-
Y6LZ]. 
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to those players who play for teams in states with higher state 
income tax. For example, taking the CBA-mandated $925,000 
entry-level salary for an NHL player drafted in the 2019 NHL 
Draft, a player drafted to one of the league’s three California 
based teams—the Anaheim Ducks, the Los Angeles Kings, or the 
San Jose Sharks—would pay a top marginal tax rate of 13.3%221 
and an effective tax rate of roughly 10.6%.222 When these figures 
are contrasted to states like Florida, Nevada, and Texas—all of 
which have NHL teams that have no state income tax—it is 
calculated that playing in a low or no-tax state can effectively 
save players that play in those states up to $90,000 per year. The 
actual computation of an athlete’s tax return is much more 
convoluted than this brief example as athletes must generally file 
taxes in each state in which they work throughout the year.223 
Nevertheless, the amount an athlete saves in taxes from playing 
a majority of their games in a low state-tax state is far from 
negligible and certainly comes into play when veteran free agents 
consider signing subsequent contracts with teams.224 Under the 
proposal that this Article proffers, a player who was selected to 
play for a team in a state with a higher tax rate would be able to 
factor that into his—and his agent’s—negotiations with a team so 
that the player was not at a disadvantage relative to his peers in 
lower-rate states. 
Simply put, the proposal that rookie or entry-level contracts 
should not have an artificially imposed maximum on them forces 
the team owners to be businessmen and make good business 
deals. With some, if not most, NFL and NHL owners’ net worth 
being measured in billions as opposed to millions, making good 
business deals is not out of the question for them. Allowing 
players the opportunity to earn more than a prescribed 
maximum does not mean that owners will be forced to empty 
their bank accounts for unproven rookies each and every time, it 
merely affords the players who are worth more to earn their fair 
 
 221 See Katherin Loughead, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2021 
at 6, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 2021), http://files.taxfoundation.org/20210217114725/State-
Individual-Income-Tax-Rates-and-Brackets-for-2021.pdf [http://perma.cc/HP7Z-MKG5]. 
 222 See, e.g., California Income Tax Calculator, SMARTASSET, 
http://smartasset.com/taxes/california-tax-calculator [http://perma.cc/P4FN-A872] (last 
visited May 6, 2020).  
 223 See generally John Calvin, Itching for the Jock Tax, AM. SPECTATOR (June 1, 2016, 
12:00 AM), http://spectator.org/itching-for-the-jock-tax/ [http://perma.cc/N2PT-J64G]. This 
brief tax calculation does not take into account any standard or itemized deductions that 
might be available to the athlete or if they file jointly with a spouse. 
 224 See generally Bowes, supra note 220; Ryan Lake, Mark Stone Hit The Tax Jackpot 
With Trade To Vegas Golden Knights, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanlake/2019/03/07/mark-stone-hits-the-tax-jackpot-in-
vegas/#6842267c748c [http://perma.cc/DS4G-NUKA]. 
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share faster. In turn, this leads to increased player satisfaction 
and loyalty, increased productivity on the field of play, and a 
better feel for fans of the team who do not have to witness their 
favorite player sitting out. Allowing young players their shot to 
earn a fair salary ultimately benefits all interested parties.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Professional athletes have a finite amount of time to cash in 
on the earning potential that they spent their entire lifetime 
building. With the developments of modern medicine giving us a 
glimpse into just how much damage these young men do to their 
bodies, it is more important than ever that athletes utilize the 
very limited time they have to the fullest. Rookie or entry-level 
players that are forced to take less than fair-market value for 
their services while they earn their places in the league is a 
disservice to the blood, sweat, and tears that professional 
athletes put into their careers. The barriers to entry to a career 
in professional sports are some of the highest in North America 
on their own, and these barriers should not be made artificially 
higher due to players’ associations negotiating in bad faith and 
not fairly representing a certain class of members in their 
unions.  
Although recent holdouts have been met with mixed results 
from critics,225 it is clear that the players who make the 
calculated risk to sit out for days, weeks, or months at a time are 
doing so with the notion that the value of services they provide to 
their respective teams is vastly underappreciated by ownership. 
Simply put, these players deserve better. They deserve better 
from team owners and they especially deserve better from their 
players’ associations—the very people that are supposed to be in 
their corner, fighting for their best interests.  
 
 225 Compare Jesse Washington, Le’Veon Bell is smarter than you think, UNDEFEATED 
(Nov. 14, 2018), http://theundefeated.com/features/leveon-bell-pittsburgh-steelers-is-
smarter-than-you-think/ [http://perma.cc/9V7W-KZHE], with Mike Tanier, Le’Veon Bell’s 
Holdout Has Become a Historic Disaster…for Le’Veon Bell, BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 6, 2018), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2804597-leveon-bells-holdout-has-become-a-historic-
disasterfor-leveon-bell [http://perma.cc/8PUQ-8SWH]. 
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      Appendix A 
Salary Inequality and Parity Comparison in Major Professional Sports226 
League “Fairness Metric” Rank “Fairness Metric” 
Raw Ratio 
NFL227 5 of 18 1.38:1 
NBA228 6 of 18 1.98:1 
NHL229 7 of 18 2.30:1 
MLB230 9 of 18 3.53:1 
Premier League (England)231 12 of 18 6.82:1 
Serie A (Italy)232 13 of 18 16:1 
La Liga (Spain)233 15 of 18 19:1 
Bundesliga (Germany)234 16 of 18 20.5:1 
Ligue 1 (France)235 18 of 18 26.6:1 
 
 
 226 See generally Global Sports Salaries Survey 2018, supra note 51. 
 227 Id. at 58. 
 228 Id. at 42. 
 229 Id. at 66. 
 230 Id. at 50. 
 231 Id. at 54. 
 232 Id. at 70. 
 233 Id. at 62. 
 234 Id. at 74. 
 235 Id. at 78. 
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         Appendix B 
1995 NHL CBA Entry-Level Compensation by Draft Year236 
Draft Year NHL Compensation 
1995 US$ 850,000 
1996 US$ 875,000 
1997 US$ 925,000 
1998 US$ 975,000 
1999 US$ 1,025,000 
2000 US$ 1,075,000 
2001 US$ 1,130,000 
2002 US$ 1,185,000 
2003 US$ 1,240,000 
2004 US$ 1,295,000 
 
               Appendix C 
2005 NHL CBA Entry-Level Compensation by Draft Year237 
Draft Year NHL Compensation 
2005 US$ 850,000 
2006 US$ 850,000 
2007 US$ 875,000 
2008 US$ 875,000 
2009 US$ 900,000 
2010 US$ 900,000 
2011 US$ 925,000 
2012238 US$ 925,000 
 
 
 236 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 85, at art. 9.3(a). 
 237 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 94, at art. 9.3(a). 
 238 Id. (“If the NHLPA exercises its right to extend this Agreement until 2012, the 
maximum annual aggregate Paragraph 1 NHL Salary . . . shall be U.S. $925,000.”). 
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Appendix D239 
NFLPA Player Representatives 
Team Player Representative Years in League240 
Arizona Cardinals Corey Peters 10 years 
Atlanta Falcons Josh Harris 8 years 
Baltimore Ravens Ronnie Stanley 4 years 
Buffalo Bills Patrick DiMarco 8 years 
Carolina Panthers Greg Van Roten 8 years 
Chicago Bears Chase Daniel 10 years 
Cincinnati Bengals Geno Atkins 10 years 
Cleveland Browns Jarvis Landry 6 years 
Dallas Cowboys Byron Jones 5 years 
Denver Broncos Brandon McManus 6 years 
Detroit Lions Devon Kennard 6 years 
Green Bay Packers Aaron Rodgers 15 years 
Houston Texans Brennan Scarlett 4 years 
Indianapolis Colts Clayton Geathers 5 years 
Jacksonville Jaguars Calais Campbell241 12 years 
Kansas City Chiefs Dustin Colquitt 15 years 
Las Vegas Raiders Rodney Hudson 9 years 
Los Angeles Chargers Mike Pouncey 9 years 
Los Angeles Rams Todd Gurley242 5 years 
Miami Dolphins Christian Wilkins 1 year 
Minnesota Vikings Adam Thielen 6 years 
New England Patriots Matt Slater 12 years 
New Orleans Saints Craig Robertson 8 years 
New York Giants Nate Solder 9 years 
New York Jets Quincy Enunwa 6 years 
Philadelphia Eagles Malcolm Jenkins 11 years 
 
 239 Board of Player Representatives, supra note 173. 
 240 See, e.g., 2020 NFL Players, FOX SPORTS (last visited May 16, 2020), 
http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/players [http://perma.cc/P9NJ-XB46] (showing experience 
calculations conducted by the author accurate as of the conclusion of the 2019 NFL 
season). 
 241 See Nick Shook, Jaguars to trade DE Calais Campbell to Ravens, NFL (Mar. 15, 
2020, 2:38 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/jaguars-to-trade-de-calais-campbell-to-ravens-
0ap3000001106265 [http://perma.cc/ETF7-SNFZ]. 
 242 See Kevin Patra, Rams release former OPOY, standout Todd Gurley, NFL (Mar. 
19, 2020, 5:48 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/rams-release-former-opoy-standout-todd-
gurley-0ap3000001107050 [http://perma.cc/9MH4-XDV5]. 
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Pittsburgh Steelers Ramon Foster 
 
11 years 
San Francisco 49ers Richard Sherman 9 years 
Seattle Seahawks K.J. Wright 9 years 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers Ali Marpet 5 years 
Tennessee Titans Wesley Woodyard 12 years 
Washington Redskins Nick Sundberg 10 years 
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Appendix E243 
NHLPA Player Representatives 
Team Player Representative Years in League244 
Anaheim Ducks Josh Manson 6 years 
Arizona Coyotes Derek Stepan 10 years 
Boston Bruins Brandon Carlo 4 years 
Buffalo Sabres Jake McCabe 7 years 
Calgary Flames Mikael Backlund 11 years 
Carolina Hurricanes Jordan Martinook 8 years 
Chicago Blackhawks Jonathan Toews 13 years 
Colorado Avalanche Ian Cole 10 years 
Columbus Blue Jackets David Savard 10 years 
Dallas Stars Jason Dickinson 5 years 
Detroit Red Wings Luke Glendening 7 years 
Edmonton Oilers Darnell Nurse 5 years 
Florida Panthers Michael Matheson 5 years 
Los Angeles Kings Matt Roy 3 years 
Minnesota Wild Devan Dubnyk 11 years 
Montreal Canadiens Paul Byron 11 years 
Nashville Predators Yannick Weber 12 years 
New Jersey Devils Kyle Palmieri 10 years 
New York Islanders Anders Lee 8 years 
New York Rangers Jacob Trouba 7 years 
Ottawa Senators Brady Tkachuk 2 years 
Philadelphia Flyers James Van Riemsdyk 11 years 
Pittsburgh Penguins Kristopher Letang 13 years 
San Jose Sharks Logan Couture 11 years 
St. Louis Blues Colton Parayko 5 years 
Tampa Bay Lightning Alexander Killorn 8 years 
Toronto Maple Leafs Zach Hyman 5 years 
Vancouver Canucks Bo Horvat 6 years 
Vegas Golden Knights Nate Schmidt 8 years 
Washington Capitals Thomas Wilson 7 years 
Winnipeg Jets Adam Lowry 7 years 
 
 243 Executive Board, supra note 173. 
 244 CAPFRIENDLY, http://www.capfriendly.com [http://perma.cc/W5VA-CBNT] (last visited Apr. 1, 
2020). At the time of this writing, the 2019–20 NHL season was on hiatus due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Years of experience data accurate counting the 2019–20 season as a full year. 
